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Abstract
Decisions in a group often result in imitation and aggregation, which
are enhanced in panic, dangerous, stressful or negative situations. Cur-
rent explanations of this enhancement are restricted to particular contexts,
such as anti-predatory behavior [9, 7], deflection of responsibility in hu-
mans [4, 13], or cases in which the negative situation is associated with an
increase in uncertainty [6, 12]. But this effect is observed across taxa and
in very diverse conditions, suggesting that it may arise from a more gen-
eral cause, such as a fundamental characteristic of social decision-making.
Current decision-making theories do not explain it, but we noted that they
concentrate on estimating which of the available options is the best one,
implicitly neglecting the cases in which several options can be good at the
same time [2, 3, 10]. We explore a more general model of decision-making
that instead estimates the probability that each option is good, allowing
several options to be good simultaneously [1]. This model predicts with
great generality the enhanced imitation in negative situations. Fish and
human behavioral data showing an increased imitation behavior in neg-
ative circumstances [8, 5] are well described by this type of decisions to
choose a good option.
1 Theory
Let us consider the simple case of an individual choosing between two options,
x and y. Each option can be good or bad, so there are four possibilities: Both
options are good (XY ), both are bad (X¯Y¯ ), and one good and one bad (X¯Y
and XY¯ ), Figure 1A.
The subject can use its private information (C) and the decisions made by
other individuals (B) to estimate the probability for each of the four cases. For
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Figure 1: Description of the theory. (A) The subjects choose between
two options, x and y. Each option can be good or bad, so there are four
possibilities (both options are good (XY ), both options are bad (X¯Y¯ ), x is
good and y is bad (XY¯ ) and x bad, y good (X¯Y ). (B) Top: When individuals
estimate which option is best, they compare the probability that x is good
and y is bad, P (XY¯ ), with the probability that x is bad and y is good, P (X¯Y ).
Bottom: When individuals estimate whether each option is good they compare
the probability that x is good, P (XY ) +P (XY¯ ), with the probability that y is
good, P (XY )+P (X¯Y ). (C) Tendency to follow the majority (Px/Py, assuming
that the majority has chosen x giving P (B|XY¯ )/P (B|X¯Y ) = 4), as a function
of the probability that the options are good (assuming that both options seem
identical).
example, to estimate the probability that x is good and y is bad (XY¯ ) applying
Bayes’ theorem we get1
P (XY¯ |B,C) = P (B|XY¯ )P (XY¯ |C)
P (B|C) . (1)
Private and social information are separated in the numerator of Equation 1.
The social term P (B|XY¯ ) measures how strongly the behaviors of the other
individuals indicate that x is good and y is bad. We can expand this term to
find an explicit expression [10, 1], but it is not necessary here because our results
will be independent of it.
Private information is contained in the term P (XY¯ |C). Assuming that each
option can be good or bad independently of the other we have P (XY¯ |C) =
P (X|C)P (Y¯ |C). We consider the symmetric case, in which both options have
equal probability of being good using only private information, g ≡ P (X|C) =
P (Y |C). Note that P (Y¯ |C) = 1− P (Y |C) = 1− g, so Equation 1 becomes
P (XY¯ |B,C) = P (B|XY¯ )g(1− g)
P (B|C) . (2)
1Note that P (B|XY¯ ,C) = P (B|XY¯ ) because C represents information about the goodness
of the options, so it does not add anything to the estimation when we restrict ourselves to x
being good and y being bad, as in P (B|XY¯ ,C).
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An individual that wants to choose the best option needs to compare P (XY¯ |B,C)
with P (X¯Y |B,C) (Figure 1B, top). The ratio between these two probabilities
is
P (x is the best)
P (y is the best)
=
P (B|XY¯ )g(1− g)
P (B|X¯Y )(1− g)g =
P (B|XY¯ )
P (B|X¯Y ) (3)
The result does not depend on the individual’s private estimate of the quality
of the options (g) (blue line in Figure 1C). Therefore, decision-making models
based on finding the best choice fail to reproduce the increase of aggregation in
adverse conditions. This is the case of Information Cascades [2, 3] and other
similar models [10].
An individual that wants to choose a good option needs to compare P (x is good) =
P (XY¯ |B,C) + P (XY |B,C) with P (y is good) = P (X¯Y |B,C) + P (XY |B,C)
(Figure 1B, bottom). The ratio between these two probabilities is
P (x is good)
P (y is good)
=
P (B|XY¯ )g(1− g) + P (B|XY )g2
P (B|X¯Y )(1− g)g + P (B|XY )g2 . (4)
Equation 4 reproduces the experimental observations (Figure 1C, red line):
When the individuals perceive that conditions are good (g → 1 and the ratio
tends to 1) they follow each other less than when they perceive that conditions
are bad (g → 0 and the ratio tends to the same value as Equation 3).
2 Tests of the theory
The model accurately reproduces data of several species [1, 11]. Here we test it
quantitatively in experiments that manipulate the overall quality of the options.
2.1 Group cohesion in fish
To simulate the behavior of a group of free-moving animals we compute the
probability that each position in space (each pixel in Figure 2A) is a good place.
We use a model like Equation 4, assuming that each animal contributes to the
probability of all locations within a certain radius. Animals move at constant
speed, choosing their destination with a probability given by the model [1].
In good conditions few individuals are enough to obtain a high probability that
their surroundings are good (Figure 2A, top). If conditions suddenly deteriorate
(for example because of an alarm signal), only high-density regions maintain a
high probability of being good (Figure 2A, middle). Animals will tend to go
to these regions, and after a short time the group becomes tighter (Figure 2A,
bottom).
[8] studied the statistics of group sizes of killifish in conditions with different
private information: control, food odour, alarm odour and a mixture food and
alarm odours. They find that groups tend to be bigger when conditions are
negative (Figure 2B, blue dots). We found a very good correspondence with
this data by changing the parameter of private information in each condition,
3
Figure 2: Tests of the theory. (A) Results of simulation for a control con-
dition (top), just after a sudden change in private information (middle) and
after some time (bottom). Red dots indicate the positions of the animals, and
the color indicates the probability that each position is a good place according
to the model. (B) Statistics of group sizes for the different conditions of the
experiment by [8]. Experimental results (dots) and fit with the model (red lines,
all parameters except g remain constant in the four conditions). (C) Proability
of relying on the opinion of another person as a function of the proportion of
good cards, for the experimental results of [5] (dots) and the model (line).
while keeping all other parameters constant across conditions (Figure 2B, red
lines).
2.2 Decision-making in humans
A more stringent test of the theory can be done using experiments in which
the value of the private information parameter g is set experimentally, instead
of being a parameter of the fit. [5] studied how much humans rely on social
information depending on the probability of success. The subject must choose
one card out of eight, getting a reward if it is a ’good’ card. The subject knows
the proportion of good cards, and she can either choose one card herself or rely
on the opinion of another person. The results show the trend predicted by the
model: Subjects rely on social information more when the probability that each
option is good is low (Figure 2C, dots for experimental results, lines for the
model in Equation 4 (see details in [1]).
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